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Abstract: Evolutionary theory predicts that observable traits should evolve to reliably8
indicate unobservable behavioral tendencies in coordination games but not social dilem-9
mas. We conducted a two-part study to test this idea. First, we recorded 60-second10
videos of participants, and then these participants played a stag hunt game or a pris-11
oner’s dilemma. Subsequently, raters viewed these videos, with either the sound off or12
on, and they guessed player choices. Raters showed a significant tendency to guess that13
attractive players chose stag. In contrast to the prediction, rater accuracy was at chance14
regardless of whether the sound of the video was off or on. For prisoner’s dilemma play-15
ers, raters showed a significant tendency to guess that women cooperated at a higher16
rate than men. Again in contrast to the prediction, accuracy was significantly above17
chance in this case. To calibrate the importance of this accuracy rate, we developed two18
models that suggest the accuracy we observed in the prisoner’s dilemma case is probably19
not high enough to support the evolution of cooperation. Altogether, our results show20
that raters tried to achieve a meaningful degree of accuracy about players by using the21
limited information available in the videos, but they could not do so.22
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1 Introduction24
In strategic situations, what a person does will often depend on what she thinks about25
the people around her. Coordination games provide especially clear examples of this26
principle (Young, 1996). Coordination games have multiple equilibria, and players face27
at least partially congruent incentives to coordinate their behaviors. This is why beliefs28
about others matter. When Charles talks to his father, a native of South Louisiana,29
he occasionally uses the word “lagniappe.” When he talks to his friend Ryan, a native30
of Waroona, Western Australia, he does not. Charles and his father both know that31
when they are together the word lagniappe will lead to coordinated communication. In32
contrast, Ryan is not a student of South Louisiana dialects, and Charles does not use33
them around him. Everyone has accurate expectations, and everyone is in equilibrium,34
though the equilibria depend on who is interacting with whom.35
Beliefs about others can also prove crucial in social dilemmas. Social dilemmas and36
the associated evolution of cooperation stand as one of the most active and controver-37
sial areas of research in the study of human social behavior (Henrich, 2004; Bowles and38
Gintis, 2011). Social dilemmas have dominant strategies, which simply means strategies39
that are optimal regardless of what others do. More specifically, in social dilemmas40
a decision maker can cooperate and, at some personal cost, produce benefits enjoyed41
by others. Because cooperation is individually costly, the dominant strategy is to de-42
fect unconditionally. This does not sound like a situation in which beliefs about others43
should matter. Defection is dominant, and seemingly this should be true whatever type44
of person one happens to be facing. Nonetheless, many people have social preferences45
that support conditionally cooperative behavior (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fehr and Fis-46
chbacher, 2004). These people are willing to cooperate conditional on a sufficiently47
strong belief that others will also cooperate. For these people, social preferences trans-48
form a game that is nominally a social dilemma into a coordination game, and so beliefs49
about the propensity of others to cooperate can be decisive (Bowles, 2004; Camerer and50
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Fehr, 2006).51
In sum, beliefs about others play a fundamental role in diverse social settings. They52
can determine, among countless other phenomena, if an employee works hard on a team53
project (Bowles, 2004), when a Bolivian driver switches from one side of the road to54
the other (Camerer, 2003), which Ethiopian pastoralists conserve their natural resources55
(Rustagi et al., 2010), if Sudanese families circumcise their daughters (Mackie, 1996),56
and whether a customer asks for lagniappe at the local fruit stand. In many cases,57
beliefs are based on some kind of mutual history together because people have interacted58
repeatedly or they know they share some relevant cultural background. What, however,59
does someone do given little or no appropriate experience? What does someone think,60
and by extension how does someone behave, when interacting with a stranger or recent61
acquaintance? This paper focuses on the accuracy of beliefs about others under this kind62
of limited information. Specifically, we present results from an experiment that varied63
both the game people played and the amount of information available about these players64
to determine if and when, figuratively speaking, we can see inside.65
Given limited information about someone, an especially simple approach would be66
to rely on beliefs about the distribution of choices made by randomly selected unfamiliar67
partners. Consider someone playing the stag hunt game in Table 1. The stag hunt game68
is a coordination game with two pure-strategy equilibria, namely both play stag or both69
play hare. If both play stag, both players receive a large payoff (60 in Table 1). Playing70
stag, however, involves a certain danger because, if one’s partner plays hare, playing stag71
yields a low payoff (6 in Table 1). In contrast, if both players play hare, both receive72
an intermediate payoff (40 in Table 1), and playing hare involves little or no danger.73
Even if one’s partner plays stag, one still receives an intermediate payoff by playing hare74
(40 in Table 1). Altogether, playing stag brings a large payoff if one coordinates and75
a small payoff if one miscoordinates. Playing hare brings an intermediate payoff if one76
coordinates and an intermediate payoff, possibly the same, if one miscoordinates. The77
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key question about a stag hunt player is whether she will tolerate the danger of playing78
stag in order to support the potential for the large payoffs that come from coordinating79
on stag. Empirically, people vary in their tendencies to play stag because they vary80
in their willingness to tolerate this danger and in their beliefs about others (Camerer,81
2003). Assume that, for whatever reason, a focal player believes a randomly selected82
partner will play stag with some probability. Further assume that, when paired with83
a stranger to play the game, our focal player simply asks herself if this probability is84
sufficiently large to play stag herself. The decision-making procedure in this case does85
not involve any information about the specific stranger at hand. It involves only an86
indiscriminate, unconditional belief about randomly selected partners.87
For conditionally cooperative individuals, the same procedure could apply when play-88
ing the prisoner’s dilemma game in Table 2. In this case, the relevant question about a89
prisoner’s dilemma player is whether she will provide benefits for another even though90
this choice is always costly in material terms. As in the stag hunt game discussed above,91
assume a focal player believes a randomly selected individual will cooperate with some92
probability. When paired with a randomly selected stranger, the focal player asks herself93
if this probability is sufficiently large to cooperate herself. As before, this approach uses94
no information about the specific, unfamiliar partner who happens to be present. It95
depends only on disembodied beliefs about the population of potential partners.96
We know, however, that people do not often rely on disembodied beliefs. Instead,97
they make snap judgments about others based on cursory contact and limited informa-98
tion. People discriminate based on ethnicity, gender, language, clothing, appearance,99
mannerisms, and many other traits that are readily observable (Dovidio et al., 2005;100
Willis and Todorov, 2006; Carre´ et al., 2009; Fetchenhauer et al., 2010; Stirrat and Per-101
rett, 2010). Unlike the indiscriminate beliefs described above, beliefs are conditional on102
a partner’s observable characteristics. Instead of ignoring the specific partner at hand,103
a decision maker somehow observes the person in front of her and makes a rapid as-104
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sessment. One might try to assess, for example, whether another person can tolerate105
the danger of playing stag or if another person has the social preferences necessary to106
support conditional cooperation.107
Interestingly, several recent studies suggest that conditional beliefs based on observ-108
able traits could be accurate. As one important example, men with wide faces tend109
to be aggressive and untrustworthy, while independent raters tend to believe that men110
with wide faces are aggressive and untrustworthy (Carre´ et al., 2009; Carre´ and Mc-111
Cormick, 2008; Stirrat and Perrett, 2010; Haselhuhn and Wong, 2012). These studies112
do not show that beliefs about a specific man’s behavior, conditional on observing a113
specific man’s face, are accurate. Nonetheless, perceived behavioral tendencies and ac-114
tual behavioral tendencies are statistically associated with facial width in the same way,115
which plainly suggests that conditional beliefs about individuals could be accurate. If116
conditional beliefs are accurate, they could dramatically improve the ability of decision117
makers to interact with others effectively. A decision maker, for example, could inter-118
act with another person but condition her choices on the person’s type, where type is119
represented by observable characteristics. Alternatively, a decision maker could choose120
between interacting with the person or foregoing the exchange altogether to pursue some121
more promising use of her time. In either case, conditional beliefs and by extension con-122
ditional behavior could improve the expected outcome for the decision maker precisely123
because of an ability to rapidly draw accurate inferences about other people.124
Evolutionary theory makes clear predictions about when inferences of this sort should125
be accurate. With social dilemmas, inferences should typically not be accurate, and the126
logic is compelling. A conditionally cooperative individual needs to identify those who127
will cooperate and those who will not in order to reduce the risk of exploitation (Hen-128
rich, 2004). If, however, a cooperative person has only limited information about a129
partner, how can she infer what kind of person this partner is? She can only make130
an accurate inference if the unobservable tendency to cooperate is reliably associated131
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with an observable marker of some kind. If this is the case, cooperative individuals can132
condition their beliefs and their choices on the presence of the marker. This kind of133
system, however, will not be evolutionarily stable for arbitrary markers that have costs134
unrelated to behavior. Once we allow a mutation that produces the marker without the135
tendency to cooperate, the mutation in question will invade the population. Because we136
generally have no reason to preclude such a mutation (Henrich, 2004), we expect that137
readily observable traits will usually not be associated with an unobservable tendency to138
cooperate in social dilemmas (Dawkins, 1976; Efferson and Vogt, 2013). Consequently,139
accurate inferences under limited information will not be possible. Intuitively, individu-140
als do not have a shared interest in accurate information. If cooperative individuals use141
observable traits as a basis for cooperating conditionally, material incentives strongly142
favor defectors who mimic cooperators and trick them into cooperating. Once we allow143
such a masquerade, it flourishes immediately, reduces the accuracy of conditional beliefs,144
and eliminates the advantages of marker-based conditional cooperation.145
Coordination games are very different because players have a shared interest in ac-146
curate information and coordinated choices. If a population includes individuals who147
tend to play different behaviors in a coordination game, deceiving others brings little148
or no advantage. Although in some coordination games everyone may not agree about149
where to coordinate, everyone does have a shared interest in coordinating. To continue150
with our stag hunt example, some players may expect or prefer to coordinate on stag.151
Others, in contrast, may be unwilling to tolerate the potential for the big material loss152
(e.g. an unsuccessful hunt) that can occur when playing stag. These players may expect153
to coordinate on hare. Because players can vary in terms of their expectations or their154
preferences over material outcomes, they can vary in terms of whether they play stag155
or hare (Camerer, 2003). All players, however, prefer coordinating to miscoordinating.156
Consequently, the incentives to misrepresent one’s likely behavior in the near future are157
much less than in social dilemmas. This means that arbitrary observable markers can158
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be dynamically stable indicators of behavioral tendencies in coordination games. Even159
more strongly, markers that are initially meaningless can acquire meaning endogenously160
because they help people draw accurate inferences about each other. This kind of evolu-161
tionary process works precisely because people have a shared interest in coordination and162
the accurate information it requires. Ex post, those who play one equilibrium strategy163
can separate themselves from those who play another equilibrium strategy (McElreath164
et al., 2003; Efferson et al., 2008).165
The upshot is the following. In a social dilemma, readily available information about166
how a person will behave should often be suspect, and inferences about others based167
on limited information should only produce accuracy rates at chance. In a coordination168
game, in contrast, our inclinations should often be written all over our faces. To test169
these predictions, we conducted an experimental study that directly addresses inferential170
accuracy about others under limited information. Specifically, one group of subjects171
played one of two strategic games, either the coordination game in Table 1 or the social172
dilemma in Table 2. We call these subjects “players.” Subsequently, a second group of173
subjects watched short videos of these players and guessed their choices in the games.174
We call these subjects “raters.” We predicted that raters would not be able to accurately175
guess the choices of social dilemma players. This follows from the logic, outlined above,176
that conspicuous markers of underlying behavioral tendencies should typically not be177
stable in a social dilemma. Thus, the raters in our experiment, who had only brief178
exposure to the social dilemma players via the videos we showed them, should not have179
been able to accurately guess player choices. In contrast, we predicted that raters would180
be able to accurately guess the choices of coordination game players. This prediction181
arises from the fact that arbitrary observable traits readily evolve to serve as stable182
markers of behavioral tendencies in coordination games. Observable traits, whether they183
evolve genetically or culturally, can acquire and retain meaning because everyone has184
some shared interest in accurate information about others. This shared interest can be185
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especially critical if people vary in terms of their unobservable preferences over material186
outcomes or if they come from historically separated sub-populations (McElreath et al.,187
2003; Efferson et al., 2008). If an evolutionary process occurs under circumstances of188
this sort, it implies scope for inferential accuracy regardless of what the markers actually189
are in practice and regardless of whether people are fully aware of how they use them.190
With one important caveat, our data support none of the above predictions.191
2 Experimental Methods192
Our experiment consisted of two parts (electronic supplementary material). For the first193
part in Konstanz, Germany, we video recorded subjects individually for 60 seconds and194
then had them play one of two games. Videos of this sort are called “thin slices” because195
they provide brief and relatively controlled access to the personality and characteristics196
of the person in the video (Ambady and Rosenthal, 1992). In the vast majority of197
the thin slices we recorded, subjects discussed their families, work, their studies at the198
university, and what they like to do in their free time. A handful of subjects described199
what they had done earlier in the day. One woman enthusiastically summarized her200
recent trip to India, and one man counted the chairs in the room and commented on201
the impassive experimenter (S.V.) behind the camera. After recording thin slices for all202
participants in an experimental session, participants played either the stag hunt game203
in Table 1 or the prisoner’s dilemma game in Table 2. For the second part of the204
experiment, another group of participants in Munich, Germany, served as raters. These205
raters viewed thin slices of either stag hunt players or prisoner’s dilemma players and206
then guessed the choices of these players in the relevant game. In addition, raters viewed207
the videos either with the sound on or with the sound off. As a result, the information208
available to raters varied because they either could or could not hear what the players209
in the thin slices were saying. This allowed us to see if an increase in the information210
available would lead to an improvement in rater accuracy. Altogether, our experiment211
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implemented a 2 × 2, between-subjects design in which we varied both the game played212
by players and the amount of information available to raters.213
In addition, we also ran separate sessions to measure the mean attractiveness of each214
player averaged over several independent participants whose only task was to evaluate215
player attractiveness (electronic supplementary material). Because the timbre of one’s216
voice might affect perceived attractiveness, we ran a session with the sound of the thin217
slices off and a session with the sound on. This resulted in two mean attractiveness218
ratings per player, and these variables appear below as important controls in several219
analyses.220
Finally, as detailed in the electronic supplementary material, we made a number221
of design choices to isolate and compare accuracy rates stemming from the thin slices222
themselves and the two games players played. First, for both games we used the same223
labeling system for the possible choices, and the labels used have no particular meaning224
or natural ordering (Tables 1 and 2). Second, we independently randomized the spatial225
location of inputs on the computer screen for each player and each rater. Together these226
two design choices meant that raters could not have an artificially inflated accuracy227
rate because both players and raters shared the same psychological focus on a specific228
label or a specific location on the input screens. Third, for each of the two games,229
we randomly sampled 30 players to show to raters subject to the constraint that the230
distribution of choices among these players would be uniform. As a result, raters viewed231
30 thin slices of stag hunt players, 15 of whom chose stag and 15 hare. Similarly, raters232
viewed 30 thin slices of prisoner’s dilemma players, 15 of whom chose cooperate and 15233
defect. Raters knew they would be presented with a uniform distribution of choices,234
but they did not know how many thin slices they would view in total. This is how we235
controlled rater beliefs about player behavior prior to viewing a thin slice, and this is236
how we held these prior beliefs constant regardless of whether the rater viewed stag hunt237
players or prisoner’s dilemma players. Controlling prior beliefs in this way is essential238
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when comparing accuracy rates across the two games, and overall it was a key part239
of our strategy for isolating any effects associated with information in the thin slices.240
More generally, our design choices eliminated the possibility that observed accuracy241
rates might reflect unwanted experimental artifacts (electronic supplementary material).242
Altogether, 36 raters viewed stag hunt players with the sound off (1080 observations), 36243
raters viewed stag hunt players with the sound on (1080 observations), 35 raters viewed244
prisoner’s dilemma players with the sound off (1050 observations), and 36 raters viewed245
prisoner’s dilemma players with the sound on (1080 observations). When modeling rater246
guesses, we control for multiple observations per rater by clustering on rater (electronic247
supplementary material).248
3 The Use of Thin Slices249
Before turning to the results, we would like to address a crucial methodological issue.250
Namely, when information about a person can take so many different forms, and when251
communication can occur in so many different ways, why should a researcher use thin252
slices? We see at least three compelling reasons. First, thin slices carry an extensive253
empirical precedent. Past research has shown that people can use thin slices to draw254
accurate inferences about others in a wide variety of domains, including marital happi-255
ness, sexual orientation, intelligence, socioeconomic status, and altruism (Ambady and256
Rosenthal, 1992; Ambady et al., 1999; Borkenau et al., 2004; Kraus and Keltner, 2009;257
Fetchenhauer et al., 2010). As a result, previous research suggests that, for those ex-258
amining how people draw inferences about others given limited information, thin slices259
offer an excellent place to start.260
Second, thin slices represent a useful balance between experimental control and ex-261
ternal validity. On the one hand, we can imagine a procedure in which the experi-262
menter places a participant in a situation with precisely two possible behaviors, and263
the experimenter further requires the participant to choose one of two predetermined264
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messages communicating the participant’s intended behavior to some unknown person.265
This method offers complete control for the experimenter, but its similarity to social266
interactions outside the lab is arguably limited. On the other hand, we can imagine an267
alternative procedure in which the experimenter tells two participants, say a player and268
a rater, to go off and get to know each other for as long as they desire. When they269
are ready to continue, they can call the experimenter’s mobile phone, then everyone will270
rendezvous in the lab and proceed with the study. Communication between the two271
participants in this case is extremely similar to communication outside the lab, but the272
scientist has no control of any kind over what happens.273
Thin slices stand between these two extremes. They offer perfect control over the274
amount of time available for communicating. In addition, by decomposing a thin slice275
into an audio recording and a video recording, thin slices offer considerable control over276
the extent to which communication is verbal versus visual. Given that verbal language277
plausibly evolved from a human social psychology rooted in non-verbal communication278
(Tomasello, 2008), we can expect both types of communication to be important. All in279
all, thin slices provide an extremely useful method for admitting the subtleties of natural280
communication without ceding control as a researcher.281
Finally, when thin slices are recorded, as ours were, before participants have a detailed282
knowledge of the upcoming social interaction, they capture the non-obvious nature of283
much communication. Specifically, games like the prisoner’s dilemma and stag hunt game284
are abstract representations of broad classes of social interaction in which individuals285
make choices that affect others. Because of these external effects, social norms often play286
a strong role in governing behavior (Bowles, 2004; Bowles and Gintis, 2011). Directly and287
efficiently communicating a relevant social norm, however, is often not realistic. Social288
interactions do not always come with handy labels like prisoner’s dilemma and stag hunt289
that make the relevant norm immediately obvious. In addition, groups may differ in290
terms of social norms but not fully realize, because of limited historical contact, exactly291
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how they differ (McElreath et al., 2003). To make matters even more complicated,292
individuals can have different identities and roles in society that require different norms293
based on which identity is most active at a given point in time (Akerlof and Kranton,294
2010; Benjamin et al., 2010). Put all these complexities together, and what a person295
must communicate may not always be obvious. In these cases, selection should create296
pressure for people who are different but have a shared interest in accurate information to297
somehow mark and essentialize group identity (Gil-White, 2001; McElreath et al., 2003;298
Efferson et al., 2008). This would allow people to efficiently draw statistically reliable299
inferences about others without having to rely exclusively on verbal communication to300
identify the relevant normative domain and negotiate any differences among the actors.301
4 Results302
We first present results for raters who viewed stag hunt players. A total of 45 players303
played the stag hunt game. Of these, 21 played # (stag), the choice associated with304
the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Our random sample of players, subject to a uniform305
distribution of choices, resulted in a sample of 10 men, six of whom played stag, and306
20 women, nine of whom played stag. When the sound was off for the thin slices of307
these 30 players, raters did not guess player choices above chance. Specifically, over308
all guesses the proportion correct was 0.497, and the 95% robust confidence interval309
clustered on rater is [0.472,0.522]. When the sound was on, raters were also not above310
chance, with an overall accuracy rate of 0.514 and a 95% robust confidence interval311
clustered on rater of [0.482,0.545]. In addition, a probit regression of accuracy as a312
function of the four treatments also shows that the increase in accuracy when the sound313
was on is not significant and that rater accuracy was not above chance in either of the314
stag hunt treatments (Table 3).315
Although rater accuracy was not above chance when viewing thin slices of stag hunt316
players, rater guesses may still have varied systematically in some way. To see if this317
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was so, and in particular to see if rater guesses varied according to some attribute of318
players or raters, we conducted a large model selection exercise (electronic supplementary319
material) using information theoretic criteria (Burnham and Anderson, 2002). This320
exercise produced the following robust result. When viewing thin slices of stag hunt321
players, either with the sound off or on, the attractiveness of the player was the key322
variable associated with rater guesses (electronic supplementary material, Tables S2 and323
S5). In particular, raters guessed # (stag) with a higher probability for more attractive324
players. Although the exact size of the effect varied some according to model specification325
and whether the sound was on or off, altogether it was robust, positive, and highly326
significant (probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered on rater, p ≤ 0.002,327
electronic supplementary material, Tables S2 – S7). Nonetheless, in spite of the fact328
that raters guessed # more often for attractive players, raters did not use and indeed329
could not have used this information to improve the accuracy of their guesses. Given330
attractiveness levels based on thin slices with the sound off (see Fig. S2 and associated331
probit regressions in the electronic supplementary material), player choices were not332
related to player attractiveness (probit regression, p = 0.467), rater accuracy was not333
significantly related to player attractiveness (probit regression, p = 0.496), and estimated334
rater accuracy was not different from chance for either extreme levels of unattractiveness335
(probit regression, p = 0.559) or attractiveness (probit regression, p = 0.462) outside our336
sample of players. Similarly, using attractiveness levels from thin slices with the sound on337
(see Fig. S3 and associated probit regressions in the electronic supplementary material),338
player behavior was not significantly related to player attractiveness (probit regression,339
p = 0.179), rater accuracy was not significantly related to player attractiveness (probit340
regression, p = 0.568), and estimated rater accuracy was not significantly different from341
chance for the two most extreme levels of attractiveness outside our sample (probit342
regression, p = 0.737 and p = 0.422).343
A total of 52 players played the prisoner’s dilemma, and 15 of them chose # (co-344
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operate). Our random sample of players, subject to a uniform distribution of choices,345
consisted of 11 males, four of whom cooperated, and 19 females, 11 of whom cooperated.346
When guessing the behavior of these 30 players, raters were significantly above chance347
when the sound of the thin slices was both off and on. With the sound off, the proportion348
of accurate guesses was 0.537 with a 95% robust confidence interval clustered on rater349
of [0.511,0.563]. With the sound on, raters guessed correctly at a rate of 0.566, and the350
95% robust confidence interval clustered on rater is [0.532,0.599]. A probit regression351
of accuracy as a function of treatment also indicates that accuracy was above chance352
in both of the prisoner’s dilemma treatments (Table 3). The increase in accuracy that353
followed from turning the sound on, however, is not significant (Table 3).354
To see if rater guesses varied systematically in the prisoner’s dilemma treatments, we355
conducted another large model selection exercise (electronic supplementary material).356
This produced clear and robust results. Namely, regardless of whether the sound of the357
thin slice was on or off, the sex of the player in the thin slice was a critical variable358
related to rater guesses (electronic supplementary material, Tables S8 and S11). In359
particular, raters guessed that females cooperated more than males, and across multiple360
regressions identified by the model selection criterion this effect is robustly significant361
(probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered on rater, p ≤ 0.01, electronic362
supplementary material, Tables S8 – S13). As mentioned above, the females in our363
sample of players did cooperate at a higher rate than the males, but this difference is364
not significant (probit regression, p = 0.256, Figs. 1 and 2). Nonetheless, raters were365
able to use the thin slices to get above chance with their guesses. When the sound was366
off, both the accuracy rate for male players and the overall accuracy rate are significant367
in the sense that the 95% robust confidence intervals clustered on rater did not span368
0.5 (Fig. 1). When the sound was on, the accuracy rates for both male and female369
players are significant in this sense, and the overall accuracy rate is thus also necessarily370
significant (Fig. 2).371
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Regression analyses (electronic supplementary material) also identified inferential372
accuracy in one additional way. When restricting attention to raters who viewed thin373
slices of prisoner’s dilemma players with the sound on, rater guesses and player choices374
are significantly and positively related (probit regressions with standard errors clustered375
on rater, p = 0.001, electronic supplementary material, Tables S11 – S13). As discussed376
above, turning the sound on did not produce a significant increase in the accuracy377
of raters viewing prisoner’s dilemma players. Nonetheless, rating prisoner’s dilemma378
players with the sound on yielded the highest accuracy rate over all treatments, and this379
fact is captured by a significant relationship between rater guesses and player choices in380
this treatment.381
Finally, over all four treatments we have little or no evidence that observed accuracy382
rates reflect a heterogeneous mix of raters with some raters guessing accurately and383
others guessing inaccurately (electronic supplementary material). Instead, raters seem384
to have been fairly homogeneous. To show this, for each treatment, ∀k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 30},385
we calculated the expected number of raters with k correct guesses under the assumption386
that all raters are identical. We then compared these theoretical distributions to the387
observed distributions for each of the four treatments. Goodness-of-fit tests like chi-388
squared or the G test are not valid here because the expected numbers of raters for many389
outcomes are extremely small (electronic supplementary material). Nonetheless, visually390
inspecting the graphs (electronic supplementary material, Fig. S1) clearly shows that391
rater heterogeneity, if it exists at all, can have at most a minor role in our data. Moreover,392
we also used a probit regression to analyze rater accuracy as a function of treatment393
and individual-level variables that control for the gender, age, empathic concern, and394
perspective-taking ability of each rater (electronic supplementary material, Table S1).395
As in Table 3, the effect for the prisoner’s dilemma dummy is significant, but none of the396
individual-level controls are significant. This finding also indicates that heterogeneity397
among raters in terms of accuracy plays little or no role in our data.398
16
5 Discussion and Conclusion399
In contrast to the prediction that inferential accuracy should be higher for coordination400
games than for social dilemmas, we found that raters guessed the choices of prisoner’s401
dilemma players more accurately than the choices of stag hunt players. Moreover, in402
contrast to the prediction that rater accuracy should not be above chance when guessing403
behavior in social dilemmas, we found accuracy rates significantly above chance when404
raters viewed thin slices of prisoner’s dilemma players. This was true for thin slices with405
the sound off and for thin slices with the sound on. When the sound was off, rater406
accuracy was driven primarily by guessing the choices of male players. When the sound407
was on, raters were above chance for both male and female players.408
Although statistically significant, how meaningful are the accuracy rates we observed409
with respect to the evolution of cooperation? To get some grip on this question, we de-410
veloped two different models, one based on conditional behavior and the other based on411
conditional group formation (electronic supplementary material). Both of these models412
include predictive accuracy, which we call q, as a key parameter. Importantly, because413
we treat q as a parameter, we do not address the evolutionary dynamics of inferential414
accuracy. We simply posit an accuracy rate of q and follow the consequences. In partic-415
ular, we take our observed accuracy rate from the prisoner’s dilemma treatment with the416
sound on as a benchmark value (i.e. q = 0.566). This is a best-case scenario for accurate417
inferences to support the evolution of cooperation because it is the highest overall accu-418
racy rate we observed. Given this accuracy rate, we identify the properties a prisoner’s419
dilemma must have for cooperation to evolve when people can, metaphorically, see inside420
at a rate of q = 0.566 and thus reduce the risk of exploitation.421
For both models, the population consists of two types of individual, A and N . In the422
conditional behavior case, pairs are formed randomly to play a simultaneous prisoner’s423
dilemma. Each A type guesses the type of her partner, and she cooperates if she thinks424
her partner is also an A. Otherwise she defects. A guess is accurate with probability425
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q. N types defect unconditionally. In the conditional group formation case, pairs are426
formed randomly. Each individual guesses the type of her partner, and these guesses are427
accurate with probability q. If an A type plays, she cooperates. If an N type plays, she428
defects. A pair plays only if both individuals agree to play. Individuals of both types429
only agree to play if they think they are paired with an A type. If one or both players430
refuse to play, each player gets some benefit associated with their best outside option.431
The models show that the inferential accuracy we observed, though statistically sig-432
nificant, is unlikely to be evolutionarily meaningful. Under the conditional behavior433
model, the benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation must exceed approximately 4.29 just to434
render A resistant to invasion by N (Fig. 3). If half of the population consists of A indi-435
viduals, the minimum ratio for A to evolve is 7.58, and minimum ratios increase rapidly436
from there for populations with a majority of N types (Fig. 3). If individuals form groups437
conditionally, the situation is even worse for cooperation. In particular, conditional group438
formation is equivalent to conditional behavior when the outside option brings no bene-439
fits (electronic supplementary material). As the outside option improves, conditions for440
the evolution of cooperation deteriorate in the sense that the required benefit-to-cost441
ratio increases (electronic supplementary material). When outside options are good, in442
particular, for virtually any distribution of types the required benefit-to-cost ratio is443
unreasonably high for A to evolve under conditional group formation and the inferential444
accuracy we observed in our experiment (Fig. 3).445
Earlier, we argued that inferential accuracy should be at chance for social dilemmas446
and significantly above chance for coordination games. We also prefigured that, with447
one caveat, our data support neither of these predictions. Specifically, in contrast to448
the predictions, inferential accuracy in our experiment was at chance for the stag hunt449
and significantly above chance for the prisoner’s dilemma. The caveat is the following.450
Although accuracy was statistically above chance for the prisoner’s dilemma, our cali-451
bration exercise shows that accuracy was probably not high enough to be evolutionarily452
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meaningful. Accurately identifying cooperative tendencies with a probability of 0.566453
can generate some assortment, but not very much. As a result, the limited information454
represented by the thin slices we recorded could only support the evolution of cooper-455
ation under especially large benefit-to-cost ratios. In this evolutionary sense, raters of456
prisoner’s dilemma players, like raters of stag hunt players, were effectively at chance in457
our experiment.458
In spite of the fact that accuracy was poor, rater guesses did vary systematically459
with the attractiveness and sex of players. This finding suggests that raters were trying460
to use the information in the thin slices to draw accurate inferences; they just could not461
do so. Presumably, with increasing amounts of information inferences would eventually462
be meaningfully accurate. Both the amount and the type of information about another463
person can vary. At one extreme, we have the anonymous interactions that typify eco-464
nomic experiments (Camerer, 2003). At the other extreme, we can imagine two people465
who have known each other for years and have a close personal relationship. At some466
point between these extremes, the amount and type of information available should allow467
one person to accurately predict the behavior of the other person in a particular type of468
social interaction. If either the amount of information is inadequate or the type of infor-469
mation is inappropriate, accuracy will not be above chance. In our study, for example,470
rater accuracy might have been at chance for stag hunt players because the thin slices471
we recorded did not capture the right kind of information. Precisely because any set of472
arbitrary markers can evolve to serve as coordination devices (McElreath et al., 2003;473
Efferson et al., 2008), the space of markers that can potentially serve this role is very474
large indeed. In effect, from symbols of group affiliation to non-verbal and verbal lan-475
guages, many different kinds of language can be used to convey the information players476
need to coordinate. Moreover, raters may or may not use information effectively. In-477
group favoritism, parochialism, and associated prejudices may interact with information478
a person has about specific individuals to reduce or increase the probability of accurately479
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assessing another’s intentions. The larger scientific task is to delineate, for a given type480
of social interaction, how much information people require and what kind of information481
they require. We found that raters tended to guess that attractive people play stag and482
that women cooperate. These patterns were robust, but neither yielded accuracy rates483
high enough to be evolutionarily meaningful. Given 60-second thin slices, people try to484
see inside, but they cannot.485
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Table 1: The stag hunt game. For each outcome, payoffs are shown for the row player
first and then the column player. For participants who played the game, three points
were equivalent to one Euro. Although “Stag” and “Hare” are included here for clarity,
players and raters only saw the arbitrary labels # and @.
Stag (#) Hare (@)
Stag (#) 60, 60 6, 40
Hare (@) 40, 6 40, 40
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Table 2: The prisoner’s dilemma. For each outcome, payoffs are shown for the row player
first and then the column player. For participants who played the game, three points
were equivalent to one Euro. Although “Cooperate” and “Defect” are included here for
clarity, players and raters only saw the arbitrary labels # and @.
Cooperate (#) Defect (@)
Cooperate (#) 60, 60 20, 70
Defect (@) 70, 20 40, 40
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Table 3: Accuracy as a function of treatment. The accuracy of 4290 guesses are modeled
using a probit regression with robust standard errors clustered on 143 raters. Raters
guessed the choices of players who played either the stag hunt game or the prisoner’s
dilemma (PD), and raters viewed thin slices with either the sound off or on (Sound). Be-
cause the intercept is not significant, accuracy was at chance in the stag hunt treatment
with the sound off. Accuracy was also at chance with the sound on (βˆInt+βˆSound = 0.035,
p = 0.358). Finally, because the estimate for sound is not significant, turning the sound
on did not produce a significant increase in accuracy. For the prisoner’s dilemma, accu-
racy was significantly above chance with the sound off (βˆInt + βˆPD = 0.093, p = 0.004)
and with the sound on (βˆInt + βˆSound + βˆPD + βˆSound × PD = 0.166, p < 0.001). As the
interaction term shows, however, turning the sound on did not produce a significant
increase in accuracy. Overall, χ2(3) = 12.80, p = 0.005, and the pseudo-R2 = 0.002.
The limited explanatory power is due to the fact that accuracy, even when significant,
never varied far from chance for any of the treatments.
Parameter Estimate Robust Std. Error p-value
Intercept -0.007 0.031 0.820
Sound 0.042 0.049 0.391
PD 0.100 0.044 0.024
Sound × PD 0.031 0.072 0.670
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Figure 1: Player (P) behavior and rater (R) guesses separated by the sex of the player
when the sound of the thin slices was off. The left panel shows the proportion of times
that raters (black bars) guessed cooperate and players actually cooperated (grey bars)
for female players (P) and male players (P). When comparing female players to male
players, we see similar increases in the rate at which players actually chose to cooperate
and the rate at which raters guessed cooperation. This increase is highly significant for
the 1050 rater guesses shown (probit regression with robust standard errors clustered
on rater, coefficient on female is 0.614, p < 0.001) but not for the 30 player choices
(coefficient on female is 0.548, p = 0.256). The right panel shows the accuracy of raters
for female players (F(P)), male players (M(P)), and all players (F & M (P)) with 95%
confidence intervals clustered on rater. For female players, the confidence interval is
[0.479,0.553]. For male players, it is [0.535,0.613], and over all players it is [0.511,0.563].
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Figure 2: Player (P) behavior and rater (R) guesses separated by the sex of the player
when the sound of the thin slices was on. The left panel shows the proportion of times
that raters (black bars) guessed cooperate and players actually cooperated (grey bars)
for female players (P) and male players (P). When comparing female players to male
players, we see similar increases in the rate at which players actually chose to cooperate
and the rate at which raters guessed cooperation. This increase is highly significant for
the 1080 rater guesses shown (probit regression with robust standard errors clustered
on rater, coefficient on female is 0.425, p = 0.001) but not for the 30 player choices
(coefficient on female is 0.548, p = 0.256). The right panel shows the accuracy of raters
for female players (F(P)), male players (M(P)), and all players (F & M (P)) with 95%
confidence intervals clustered on rater. For female players, the confidence interval is
[0.515,0.596]. For male players, it is [0.537,0.630], and over all players it is [0.532,0.599].
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Figure 3: The minimum benefit-to-cost ratio required for cooperation to evolve given
the inferential accuracy we observed in the prisoner’s dilemma treatment with the sound
on (q = 0.566). The solid line shows the minimum required benefit-to-cost ratio under
the conditional cooperation model as a function of the proportion of A types in the
population. The dashed line shows the minimum required benefit-to-cost ratio under
the conditional group formation model when the outside option involves a relatively low
payoff, and the dotted line shows the same when the outside option involves a relatively
high payoff. See the electronic supplementary material for additional details.
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